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SCHOOL FINANCE
To What Extent Can a State
Consider Federal Impact Aid When
Distributing State Educational Aid?
by Jay E. Grenig
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 189-193. © 2007 American Bar Association.
ISSUE
Did the secretary of education have
the authority to create and impose a
formula and certify New Mexico's
operational funding for fiscal year
1999-2000 as "equalized," thereby
diverting Impact Aid subsidies to
the state?
FACTS
The Zuni Public School District No.
89 is a New Mexico public school
district located entirely within the
Pueblo of Zuni Reservation. It has
virtually no tax base. More than 65
percent of the Gallup-McKinley
County Public School District No. 1
is Navajo Reservation lands that are
not taxable by state school districts.
Under the Impact Aid Program (20
U.S.C. § 7709 et seq.) public school
districts such as Zuni and Gallup-
McKinley that are affected by a fed-
eral presence reducing ordinary
bonding and taxing capacity are
entitled to receive federal Impact
Aid funding to offset this impact.
The program allows states to take
credit for the Impact Aid payments
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by correspondingly reducing the
amount of operational funding the
state otherwise would provide the
Impact Aid districts if the state can
establish that state-provided opera-
tional funding for its school district
is otherwise equalized. School dis-
tricts are referred to as Local
Educational Agencies or LEAs in the
statute.
In October 1999, Zuni filed an
objection to a certification made by
the Department of Education that
the state of New Mexico was equal-
ized under 20 U.S.C. § 7709(b) and
the corresponding regulations at 34
C.F.R. § 222.162. The certification
allowed New Mexico to offset its
contributions to local education
agencies, including Zuni and Gallup,
by a proportion of the federal
Impact Aid payments made to those
school districts. In November 1999,
Gallup-McKinley filed a similar
objection with the department,
alleging that New Mexico had taken
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an inappropriate proportion of
Impact Act funds into consideration
when determining state aid, in vio-
lation of 20 U.S.C. § 7709(d)(1) and
34 C.F.R. § 222.163(a). The secre-
tary denied the school districts'
objections, and they appealed to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit.
Holding that Section 7709(b) was
ambiguous, a three-judge panel of
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit ruled that the secre-
tary's construction of the statute
was permissible and warranted judi-
cial deference. The Tenth Circuit
granted rehearing en bane before
the full court. On rehearing en
bane, the decision of the secretary
was affirmed by an equally divided
court. Zuni Public School Dist. No.
89 v. U.S. Dept. of Education, 437
F.3d 1289 (10th Cir. 2006). The U.S.
Supreme Court granted the peti-
tions of Zuni and Gallup-McKinley
school districts for review. 127 S.Ct.
36 (2006).
CASE ANALYSIS
Impact Aid is compensatory finan-
cial assistance paid by the United
States to a school district whose
ability to raise local revenues is lim-
ited either as the result of the real
property within its boundaries being
tax exempt due to the property's
acquisition by the federal govern-
ment or because the school district
educates children residing on, or
whose parents are employed on,
federal property, including Indian
lands.
Generally, states may not reduce
state aid they provide to their
school districts if the school dis-
tricts receive Impact Aid. However,
20 U.S.C. § 7709(b) provides that if
a state is certified by the
Department of Education as having
a program of state aid "that equal-
izes expenditures for free publica-
tion among local educational agen-
cies in the State," then the state is
permitted to factor in the receipt of
Impact Aid funds when making its
own distributions of educational aid
to the school districts.
The exception in Section 7709(b)
first appeared in the Impact Aid
laws in 1974. That statute (20
U.S.C. § 240(d)) used general lan-
guage similar to that appearing in
the current statute. However,
instead of describing a disparity
test, the 1974 statute expressly del-
egated to the secretary the power to
define the term "equalize expendi-
tures." As authorized by 20 U.S.C.
§ 240(d), in 1976 the secretary of
education established an equaliza-
tion formula by regulation outlining
a disparity test. The regulations
directed that a state would be
deemed equalized if "the disparity
in the amount of current expendi-
tures of revenue per pupil for free
public education among local educa-
tional agencies having similar grade
levels in the state is no more than
25 per centum, as determined
according to the procedures set
forth in Appendix A to this sub-
part." Appendix A detailed the spe-
cific method by which to make the
disparity determination. First,
school districts were ranked by
expenditures or revenues per pupil,
and then those districts that fell "at
the 95th and 5th percentiles of the
total numbers of pupils in atten-
dance in the schools of those [dis-
tricts]" were eliminated. The 25
percent disparity comparison was
then made between the remaining
highest and lowest ranked school
districts.
During the 1976 notice and com-
ment process, the Department of
Education responded to a question
regarding whether the 95th and 5th
percentiles were to be calculated
based on the total number of pupils
in the state or by school districts.
The Department of Education stated:
The referenced percentiles are
based on number of pupils. [The
regulation] provides that in cal-
culating the disparity standard
according to the procedures set
forth in Appendix A, the districts
in a State will be ranked on the
basis of current expenditures or
revenue per pupil, and that those
districts which fall above the
95th and below the 5th per-
centile of those agencies will be
excluded for purposes of the cal-
culation. The percentiles will be
determined on the basis of num-
bers of pupils and not on the
basis of numbers of school
districts.
In 1994, Section 7709 was passed,
repealing and replacing Section
240(d). Section 7709 specifically
spells out the 25 percent disparity
test and includes language setting
out the basic parameters of the
required 95th and 5th percentile
determinations contained in the
earlier regulations and appendix.
The new language largely reiterated
the disparity test and percentile
determinations laid out in the
earlier regulations and appendix.
However, the percentile language in
the 1994 statute differs from that in
the earlier regulations. While the
former appendix directed that the
95th and 5th percentiles should be
calculated by "the total number of
pupils in attendance in the schools
to determine which LEAs to elimi-
nate, the 1994 statute dictates that
school districts "with per-pupil
expenditure or revenues above the
95th percentile or below the 5th
percentile of such expenditures or
revenues in the State" should be
disregarded. The legislative history
of the 1994 legislation noted that
the statute "prohibits a State from
taking Impact Aid payments into
account in determining the amount
of State aid to be paid to LEAs that
receive Impact Aid, unless that
State has an equalization plan
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approved by the secretary and
describes the standard which state
plans must meet."
After the passage of 20 U.S.C.
§ 7709, the department enacted
new regulations in 1994 replacing
the 1976 regulations. The new dis-
parity calculation language closely
mirrors the language of Section
7709. 34 C.F.R. § 222.162(a).
However, the regulation goes on to
state in fashion similar to the 1976
regulations that "[tihe method of
calculating the percentage disparity
in a State is in the appendix to this
subpart." The appendix contains the
same per-pupil expenditure ranking
method that was outlined in earlier
appendices, and it details the same
specific methodology for calculating
the 25 percent disparity test. The
appendix directs that the determi-
nation of disparity be made by
"[i]dentifying those LEAs in each
ranking that fall at the 95th and 5th
percentiles of the total number of
pupils in attendance in the schools
of those LEAs."
The history accompanying the new
regulation notes that the regulation
outlines the single statutory stan-
dard for determining whether a
state is equalized and "specifies the
method the Secretary will employ to
measure the statutory disparity
standard." In essence, the depart-
ment has adhered since 1976 to a
rule dictating that when disregard-
ing school districts to determine
whether a state is equalized, the
95th and 5th percentiles should be
calculated by the total number of
students in the state rather than by
the number of school districts.
In determining whether New Mexico
qualified in fiscal year 2000 (July 1,
1999, to June 30, 2000) as an equal-
ized state under Section 7709, the
Department of Education followed
the methodology provided in the
appendix to 34 C.F.R. § 22.162 to
decide whether school districts fell
within the 95th and 5th percentiles
of "the total number of pupils in
attendance in the schools of those
districts." Applying this methodolo-
gy to New Mexico, which has pre-
dominantly small school districts
among its 89 public school districts,
the department eliminated the 18
highest ranking and the seven low-
est ranking before ascertaining that
the newly top-ranked school district
received only 14.43 percent more
state funding than the newly bot-
tom-ranked school district. The
department concluded that New
Mexico's public school funding was
substantially equal.
Zuni and Gallup-McKinley argue that
they are entitled to receive federal
Impact Aid payments without offset
against their state operational fund-
ing because the state of New Mexico
does not qualify for the Impact Aid
exemption. They assert that the sec-
retary's methodology directly con-
flicts with the statutory language of
20 U.S.C. § 7709(b). The districts
read the section as requiring the
department to eliminate school dis-
tricts on the basis of school district
percentiles rather than by student
population percentiles.
According to the school districts,
the legislative and regulatory history
shows how two Impact Aid formulas
emerged-one authorized by the
secretary and one authorized by
Congress. Asserting that Congress
changed the system in 1996, the
districts say the 1996 changes elimi-
nated the secretary's authority to
establish the equalization formula
by creating a new and different
equalization formula.
The districts contend that the 1996
legislation requires the secretary to
disregard local educational agencies
with per-pupil expenditures or rev-
enues above the 95th percentile or
below the 5th percentile. The school
districts argue that as a result of the
1996 legislation, the total number of
students is irrelevant in determining
percentiles of per-pupil expenditures.
It is the districts' position that the
two Impact Aid formulas are radi-
cally different. The districts reason
that the statute requires exclusion
of school districts whose per-pupil
expenditures or revenues are above
the 95th percentile and below the
5th percentile of per-pupil expendi-
tures or revenues in the state.
Declaring that there are established
standard methods for making a per-
centile calculation, the districts
assert that, when the objective is to
calculate where the 95th and 5th
percentiles fall along the area of
school districts ranked by their per-
pupil revenues, no consideration
can be given to other factors such
as pupil attendance numbers. Thus,
the districts say the secretary's
injection of a pupil attendance fac-
tor into the calculation is plainly at
odds with the statute. The districts
suggest that the secretary arguably
could have acted by regulation to
require use of a particular one of
the established standard percentile
calculation methods, so long as the
regulation did not require or permit
the use of any data or factor beyond
each school district's per-pupil rev-
enues in the calculation.
The districts contend that the first
step in the secretary's formula cor-
rectly ranks the school districts by
per-pupil revenues. However, the
districts contend the secretary
improperly proceeds to eliminate
school districts from the final field
by excluding districts whose cumu-
lative pupil attendance numbers are
below the 5th percentile or above
the 95th percentile of total pupil
attendance numbers. By using a for-
mula that eliminates school districts
based on percentages of pupils
instead of eliminating districts
(Continued on Page 192)
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whose per-pupil revenues fall above
the 95th percentile or below the 5th
percentile (based on per-pupil rev-
enues) the districts assert that the
secretary excludes many New
Mexico school districts whose per-
pupil revenues fall between the 95th
and the 5th percentiles of those
school districts when ranked by per-
pupil revenues. The districts con-
clude that the secretary's formula
excluded 13 more school districts
from the final list as to which the
disparity test was applied, reducing
that field to 66 from the 79 school
districts as required by the statutory
formula.
According to the districts, when
Congress decided by statute in 1994
to establish the equalization formu-
la, it rejected the Secretary's 1976
equalization formula. Had Congress
wanted to capture the secretary's
formula in the new statute, the dis-
tricts say "the language was there
for the taking." Instead, the districts
assert that Congress took a different
course. The districts say that the
legislative history demonstrates that
Congress chose to require the secre-
tary to stop eliminating school dis-
tricts based on pupil attendance
numbers in making the equalization
calculation and instead to eliminate
school districts based on per-pupil
revenues as specified in the statute.
The districts claim that the secre-
tary's method is not an interpreta-
tion of the statutory method.
Zuni and Gallup-McKinley argue
that the secretary has no authority
to substitute the secretary's policy
choices regarding the proper impact
and formula for those of Congress.
They say that which method is
deemed the most appropriate ulti-
mately reduces to a policy choice
about which anomalies and
inequities are the most tolerable.
The districts assert that Congress
could have delegated this call to the
secretary, but did not.
It is the districts' position that the
secretary's 1995 Impact Aid formula
was not promulgated as a regulation
intended to have the force of law.
They point out that, when the secre-
tary promulgated the proposed regu-
lations, the secretary announced a
"Waiver of Proposed Rulemaking"
and exempted the process from pub-
lic notice and comment require-
ments. The districts note that the
secretary said the new regulations
"merely reflect statutory changes,
remove unnecessary and obsolete
regulatory provisions, reorganize
and clarify the language of the regu-
lations, and make minor revisions."
Thus, the districts contend that the
regulations do not establish or affect
substantive policy.
The districts claim that the control-
ling rules on statutory construction
forbid use of the secretary's formula.
According to the districts, Congress
has directly spoken by requiring use
of a different formula. Because
Congress's formula is clear, the dis-
tricts say this should be the end of
the matter. The districts argue that
the plain meaning of the 1994
statute requires use of the statutory
formula rather than the secretary's
formula.
When a court reviews an adminis-
trative agency's construction of the
statute it administers, the Supreme
Court has ruled that if the intent of
Congress is clear, that is the end of
the matter. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). If a court
determines Congress has not direct-
ly addressed the precise question at
issue and the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the spe-
cific issue, then the question for the
court under Chevron is whether the
administrative agency's answer is
based on a permissible construction
of the statute.
It is the districts' position that the
secretary's formula is not entitled to
Chevron deference. The districts
explain that administrative imple-
mentation of a particular statutory
provision qualifies for Chevron
when it appears that Congress dele-
gated authority to the agency gener-
ally to make rules carrying the force
of law, and that the agency interpre-
tation claiming deference was pro-
mulgated in the exercise of that
authority. The districts stress that
deference is not accorded merely
because the statute is ambiguous
and an administrative official is
involved. The districts claim
Congress did not give the secretary
express authority to adopt a differ-
ent formula. It also says the secre-
tary has no implied authority to
adopt a different formula.
Since the secretary's formula was not
issued in exercise of rule-making
authority, the districts conclude it is
not entitled to Chevron deference.
Furthermore, claiming the secretary's
formula is inconsistent with the statu-
tory formula, the districts say it can-
not be a permissible administrative
interpretation of the statute.
According to the respondents, the
statute is ambiguous. They assert
that when a law entrusted to an
agency's administration is ambigu-
ous, or when Congress implicitly or
explicitly left a gap in the law to be
filled in by the agency through the
formulation of policy or rules, the
courts must accept the agency's
position so long as it reflects a per-
missible construction of the lan-
guage in question. Because the
statute mandates that expenditures
or revenues be examined on a per-
pupil basis, the respondents con-
tend that the department's method
of determining the 95th and 5th
percentiles based on the total stu-
dent enrollment in the state is a
permissible construction.
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SIGNIFICANCE
If Zuni and Gallup-McKinley prevail
in this proceeding, they and other
similarly situated public school dis-
tricts that receive Impact Aid may
receive more revenue than they
would under the secretary's formula.
If the respondents prevail, public
school districts that receive Impact
Aid may receive less revenue.
However, such a ruling may result
in states having more funds avail-
able for distribution to all school
districts-including those that do
not receive Impact Aid.
Of broader significance is how the
Court with its new membership will
deal with the question of deference
to administrative agency application
of statutes. The Supreme Court has
devoted considerable attention in
the last five years in considering the
varying degrees of deference
deserved by agency pronounce-
ments. See, e.g., United States v.
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001);
Christensen v. Harris County, 529
U.S. 576 (2000); General Dynamics
Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline, 540
U.S. 581 (2004); National Cable &
Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand
X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967
(2005); Gonzales v. Oregon, 126
S.Ct. 904 (2006).
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